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THE CURIOUS CASE OF CELL PHONE LOCATION 




The third-party and public disclosure doctrines are longstanding 
hurdles to Fourth Amendment protection. Federal courts have recently 
invoked these doctrines to determine whether police can acquire cell phone 
location data from providers without constitutional scrutiny.1 These rulings 
are all over the map. Courts disagree not only on whether location 
information is constitutionally protected but also if one, both, or neither of 
these doctrines applies. The Supreme Court has yet to enter the fray. So for 
now, we are left with muddled results.2 A major reason for the confusion 
turns out to rest on a hitherto overlooked tension between the two 
doctrines. This Essay is the first to raise this issue and, in turn, harmonize 
these doctrines in the cell phone location data context.3 
While both doctrines vitiate privacy protection and are often 
associated together, they rest on unique foundational triggers.4 The third-
party doctrine involves an individual voluntarily disclosing nonpublic 
information to an actual person or entity. The Supreme Court has applied 
this doctrine to statements made to undercover informants,5 bank records 
released to banks,6 and telephone numbers disclosed to phone providers.7 
The public disclosure doctrine, on the other hand, focuses on a suspect 
making voluntary public movements that are susceptible to visual 
surveillance. The Court has applied this doctrine to police surveillance of 
suspects using beeper technology8 or a GPS device.9 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law, A.B. Dartmouth, M.Phil. 
Cambridge, J.D. Harvard. I would like to thank the editors of the Northwestern University Law Review 
Online, and specifically William Gohl and Carlo Felizardo, for their excellent editing work. 
1 See infra Part III. 
2 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, When and How Will the Supreme Court Enter the Cell-Site Fray? 
Washington Post (August 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/ 
wp/2015/08/05/when-and-how-will-the-supreme-court-enter-the-cell-site-fray [http://perma.cc/U6YR-
VR6Z]. 
3 This Essay focuses exclusively on constitutional protection without reference to statutory 
authority or any good faith exception analysis. For an example of such analysis, see generally id. 
4 See infra Parts II.A and II.B. 
5 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) [http://perma.cc/L74Y-Z2P8]. 
6 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) [http://perma.cc/9A9Z-6AQA]. 
7 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) [http://perma.cc/BWV6-HN5Z]. 
8 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) [http://perma.cc/R672-AVL6]. 
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Courts seem to pick and choose a doctrine when analyzing cell phone 
location data, with little to no analysis on why one or the other applies (or 
doesn’t apply).10 These inconsistent choices are primarily due to the unique 
nature of this technology and the different ways one can conceptualize how 
the government collects it. The data can be viewed as nonpublic 
information disclosed to a cell phone provider, suggesting a potential 
application of the third-party doctrine, or as public movements susceptible 
to visual surveillance, suggesting a potential application of the public 
disclosure doctrine. But the key to applying the right doctrine is 
recognizing in which of these two contexts the government activity is 
taking place. It matters, for example, whether the government is seeking 
historical cell phone location data or acquiring real-time data. This Essay 
provides the first workable topology for these various scenarios and, in the 
process, offers some much overdue clarification on the operative elements 
of the respective doctrines. 
Part I introduces how cell phone location data is created and collected. 
Part II details the contours of the third-party and public disclosure 
doctrines. Part III highlights the split among federal courts regarding 
whether the Fourth Amendment protects against the collection of cell 
phone location data, particularly in light of the varying applications of the 
third-party and public disclosure doctrines. Part IV outlines an approach for 
determining which of the two doctrines should apply. Finally, the Essay 
concludes by noting the implications of the cell phone location data Fourth 
Amendment conundrum for future technological developments. 
 
I. A PRIMER ON CELL PHONE LOCATION DATA 
 Cell phones use radio waves to connect to their service provider in 
order to facilitate a host of functions, including making and receiving 
phone calls, sending and receiving text messages, and using the Internet.11 
Cell phone providers, in turn, maintain thousands of cell phone towers that 
receive these radio signals.12 Cell phones emit these signals anytime they 
are turned on, after which the nearest cell phone tower acquires a signal.13 
This process is automatic without any notice to the user and a user does 
nothing to facilitate the transmission except turning on the phone.14 The 
signal moves from tower to tower as a cell phone user changes location and 
 
9 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) [http://perma.cc/SFV6-PQ76]. 
10 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010) [http://perma.cc/994D-
RRAE]; infra Part III. 
11 See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 637 (N.J. 2013) (discussing the basics of how cell phone 
location data works) [http://perma.cc/V3SH-S4PK]. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 United States v. Graham, No 12-4659, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *47 (4th Cir. August 5, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/2S5Y-ME6M]; Earls, 70 A.3d at 637. 
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the location of the nearest tower is transmitted to the provider.15 Cell phone 
company privacy policies typically include language that a user’s location 
is collected in the foregoing way.16 
It is useful to recognize three different scenarios under which the 
government tracks movements through the acquisition of cell phone 
location data: (1) historical cell phone location data, (2) real-time cell 
phone location data, and (3) actively “pinging” a cell phone for location 
data. 
Cell phone providers store location data as the normal part of their 
business of providing service.17 Police, in turn, can request that cell phone 
providers hand over this location data for a suspect over a set period of 
time.18 This information is classified as historical cell phone location data. 
This data stands in contrast to real-time location data. Whereas the 
former focuses on past locations, real-time data provides locations as they 
actually occur.19 Here, cell phone providers, upon request, give police 
contemporaneous data on the location of the nearest cell tower for tracking 
purposes.20 
“Pinging” a cell phone is a variation on the collection of 
contemporaneous cell phone location data. This time, however, the 
government does not wait for the phone itself to send its routine signal to 
the cell tower. Rather, the police request that cell phone providers send an 
affirmative signal to the suspect’s phone in order to monitor her location 
via cell towers.21 
 
 
15 Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not 
Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 702 (2011) [http://perma.cc/P2R6-NFJB]; see also Earls, 70 A.3d at 637–38 
(“Network-based location tracking relies on the network of cell sites and antennas.”). Depending on the 
provider and particular cell phone, the actual location of the cell phone may also be transmitted. 
Freiwald, supra at 713 (discussing how certain smart phones are equipped with GPS capability and that 
the phone’s specific location may also be transmitted to a provider). Because this additional 
transmission may reveal otherwise private information, the Fourth Amendment analysis under the 
public disclosure doctrine could potentially come out differently. See infra note 40 and accompanying 
text. 
16 Graham, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *20–21. 
17 Earls, 70 A.3d at 637. 
18 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) 
[http://perma.cc/3L9X-GP22]; Graham, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *9, *16 (stating “[t]he 
precision of this location data depends on the size of the identified cell sites’ geographical coverage 
ranges”). 
19 See Patrick E. Corbett, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Site Location Information: What Should 
We Do While We Wait for the Supremes?, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 215, 217 (2015). 
20 See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132–33 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) [http://perma.cc/E4SC-AHZP]. If available, police may also request the historical 
location data of the actual cell phone. Freiwald, supra note 15, at 713–14 (noting that certain police 
departments request the actual cell phone location whereas others only request the nearest cell tower). 
21 United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 350–51, 360 (D. Vt. 2013) 
[http://perma.cc/DL3E-YHHZ]. Users are not aware that this pinging is taking place. Id. at 350, 360. 
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II. FOURTH AMENDMENT DISCLOSURE DOCTRINES 
A. The Contours of the Third-Party Doctrine 
The basic premise of the third-party doctrine is readily known: an 
individual loses all reasonable expectation of privacy to information she 
discloses to another person or entity.22 The roots of the doctrine trace back 
to the use of government informants. The government has always had the 
unfettered ability to elicit incriminating statements from unwary suspects.23 
As the Court has explained, it is of no consequence that a defendant 
revealed the information “on the assumption that it will be used only for a 
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed.”24 This misplaced belief does not change the fact that the 
defendant voluntarily disclosed the information and thus took the risk that 
the government might obtain it without a warrant and use it against her at 
trial.25 The Court has expanded the application of the doctrine to include 
voluntary disclosures made to entities such as banks and telephone 
companies.26 
A central feature of the doctrine is whether the disclosure was 
voluntary or otherwise not coerced. As one simple example, eliciting 
incriminating statements by putting a gun to a suspect’s head would, in all 
likelihood, not satisfy the voluntariness requirement. This seems like an 
easy case. More recently, courts and scholars have questioned this 
requirement of voluntariness—and in turn, the application of the third-party 
doctrine—in today’s technology-dominated world where we routinely (and 
almost necessarily) make many disclosures to many entities.27 Whether it is 
disclosures to banks or emails sent via internet service providers, we are 
constantly making disclosures to third parties. Should these actions 
appropriately be considered voluntary? There may not be an easy answer 
here.28 Indeed, part of the disagreement on whether the third-party doctrine 
 
22 Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth Amendment Mosaic 
Theory, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1809, 1820–26 (2014) (discussing evolution of third-party doctrine before and 
after United States v. Katz) [http://perma.cc/6DZ3-QZW2]. 
23 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 
437–39 (1963) [http://perma.cc/72N2-HU7A]. 
24 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see also Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (“Neither this 
Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a 
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not 
reveal it.”). 
25 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. For this reason, some scholars talk about the principle as a waiver or 
consent principle. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 
588–90 (2009); Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 216–18 
(2011) [http://perma.cc/K4FC-9SM5]. 
26 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
27 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning 
the viability of the third-party doctrine in today’s technologically dominated society); Monu Bedi, 
Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
1, 25–28 (2013) (discussing scholars’ reactions to technological advancements when it comes to 
application of the third-party doctrine) [http://perma.cc/WCD7-9SCY]. 
28 Bedi, supra note 27, at 27. 
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applies to cell phone location data stems from this issue of voluntariness.29 
So ends the typical discussion of the doctrine. But this summary 
neglects some important considerations that bear on its application. The 
first relates to when the government can acquire the information. Is the 
government free to acquire the information at any point before it is 
conveyed to the third party, or must the information come from the third 
party itself? 
Take the facts of Smith v. Maryland.30 There, the government collected 
a dialed telephone number after it was conveyed to a telephone company in 
the normal course of making a call. But if the number is not protected due 
to its disclosure to the phone company, can the government acquire it 
before it reaches the company? On the one hand, the police could not, 
without first getting a warrant, enter a suspect’s home and observe the 
suspect dial the number.31 But what about tapping into public lines and 
acquiring the number before it reaches the company? This action would not 
otherwise seem to implicate the suspect’s individual Fourth Amendment 
rights.32 
The analysis in Smith suggests that the government must retrieve 
information from and with the knowledge of the third party. Otherwise, the 
assumption of risk analysis loses its meaning. The whole point of the 
expectation that a government informant or telephone company might 
disclose information assumes in the first instance that they have received 
some information.33 
It also seems that the disclosed information must be nonpublic. It is no 
accident that the Court talks about misplaced trust when discussing the 
effect of the doctrine.34 The premise here is that the information is not 
public and the person assumes the risk that the third party will nonetheless 
hand it over to the government. If the information were otherwise publicly 
available, the individual wouldn’t really be taking on any additional risk by 
disclosing it to the third party. The above cases bear this out.35 Whether it is 
statements to a confidential informant, bank statements to a bank, or 
telephone numbers to a phone company, each of these types of information 
are private or not otherwise publicly available. 
 
29 See infra Part III. 
30 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
31 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) [http://perma.cc/C54W-A963]. 
32 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (reaffirming that Fourth Amendment 
protection only applies where individual has personal expectation of privacy) [http://perma.cc/ZVR9-
8Z33]. 
33 This doesn’t mean that the government would need a warrant to tap into the public phone lines, 
but rather simply that the third-party doctrine would not seem to play a role here in assessing Fourth 
Amendment protection (or the lack of it). 
34 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966). 
35 See Smith, 442 U.S. 735; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293. 
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B. The Contours of the Public Disclosure Doctrine 
Courts and scholars alike often associate the public disclosure doctrine 
and third-party doctrine as expressing a singular principle.36 In some ways, 
this makes sense, as both doctrines involve voluntary actions by suspects 
that, in turn, vitiate Fourth Amendment protection. With the public 
disclosure doctrine, however, the focus is not on disclosing information but 
rather on making public movements or those movements that are 
susceptible to visual observation. In short, a suspect does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in her voluntarily disclosed public 
movements.37 In United States v. Knotts, for example, the police 
surreptitiously placed a beeper in the defendant’s belongings and used it to 
follow the defendant for a few hours to his ultimate destination.38 The Court 
found no problem with this type of surveillance, reasoning that: 
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another. When [the defendant] travelled over the public streets he voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over 
particular roads in a particular direction . . . .39  
The key here is that the police only monitored public movements, not 
movements within a person’s home where the Fourth Amendment would 
clearly apply.40 Moreover, it didn’t matter that the suspect was unaware of 
the beeper transmission or that the police were not in constant visual 
contact with the car as long as the movements were susceptible to visual 
surveillance.41 The analysis of Knotts under the third-party doctrine, on the 
other hand, would have come out differently. Since the suspect was not 
aware of the beeper and its emanating signal, the suspect could not have 
voluntarily disclosed his movements to the police. 
 
36 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(discussing the general viability of the third-party doctrine when assessing the permissibility of long-
term GPS surveillance); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983) (referencing Smith v. 
Maryland as the “factual counterpart” to beeper monitoring); Miriam Baer, Secrecy, Intimacy, and 
Workable Rules: Justice Sotomayor Stakes Out the Middle Ground in United States v. Jones, 123 YALE 
L.J. F. 393 (2014) [http://perma.cc/VS2G-5P23]; Bedi, supra note 22, at 1820–26; Kerr, supra note 25, 
at 588–90. 
37 Bedi, supra note 22, at 1820–26 (discussing evolution of public disclosure doctrine before and 
after United States v. Katz). 
38 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. 
39 Id. at 281–82. 
40 Compare Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) 
(finding that monitoring movements within the home triggered Fourth Amendment protection). The 
concern over nonpublic information may potentially impact how one analyzes location data of an actual 
cell phone as opposed to a public cell tower under the Fourth Amendment. If the former location data 
reveals a person’s movements in her home or a place where she has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
the public disclosure doctrine would not apply. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (citing the Knotts/Karo distinction when discussing the potential of historical location data 
revealing nonpublic locations but concluding not relevant on instant facts as the government only 
acquired cell tower or public location data). 
41 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
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The public disclosure doctrine thus does not implicate the same issues 
of how or when the government obtains information. The reason for this is 
the public nature of the movements (e.g., the car’s location) serves as the 
sole trigger. Because this information is susceptible to visual observation, it 
is per se not protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
One can still use the assumption of risk calculus with the public 
disclosure doctrine but it looks different than the third-party doctrine 
analysis. The risk here relates to the government’s surveillance of a 
person’s public movements rather than its acquisition of private 
information from an entity or person.42 
The public disclosure doctrine is not without potential limits. Knotts 
itself suggested that a different conclusion may be necessary if the 
monitoring lasted a day or longer.43 It is telling that the Court made explicit 
that “different constitutional principles” would be needed to analyze this 
long-term surveillance, and in doing so, cited to a First Amendment-related 
case.44 This analysis implies that the public disclosure doctrine on its own 
would treat long-term surveillance no differently than short-term 
surveillance—neither would receive Fourth Amendment protection. 
This concern over the potentially harsh implications of long-term 
electronic surveillance under the public disclosure doctrine leads to the 
most recent case on the doctrine, United States v. Jones.45 Here, the 
government—without the consent of the defendant or under the terms of a 
warrant—installed a Global Positioning Device (GPS) device under his car 
and tracked his public movements with the device for nearly thirty days.46 
The Court (both the majority and concurrences) wrestled with how this 
government activity could fall under the scrutiny of the Fourth Amendment 
when the public disclosure doctrine mandated that none of this surveillance 
would garner constitutional protection.47 The majority focused on the initial 
act of placing the GPS device as constituting an unlawful physical trespass, 
whereas the concurrences focused on the revelation of private information 
 
42 In turn, the debate over the voluntariness of disclosing location data under the third-party 
doctrine isn’t an issue in the public disclosure context. The cell phone user quite obviously has 
voluntarily exposed her public movements to potential visual observation. 
43 The concern here was dragnet activity by the government. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–84. 
44 Id. The Court cited to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) 
[http://perma.cc/9WQR-UYBK], which found that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
adequately protects First Amendment interests. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283; see also Bedi, supra note 22, at 
1848–57 (discussing First Amendment values in Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation analysis). 
45 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
46 Id. at 948. 
47 Id. at 951–52 (explaining that while there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public 
movements, this did not overturn the common law trespass doctrine); id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“I do not regard as dispositive the fact that the Government might obtain the fruits of GPS 
monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance techniques.”); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(citing Knotts for the proposition that short-term surveillance does not trigger Fourth Amendment 
protection). 
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(e.g., political affiliations) as a byproduct of long-term GPS surveillance.48 
Analysis of these limiting principles is beyond the scope of this Essay.49 
What matters for my purposes is that the majority decision bypassed the 
chance to alter the contours of the public disclosure doctrine, which for 
now does not hinge on the length of surveillance.50 
 
III. DISAGREEMENT AMONGST FEDERAL COURTS ANALYZING 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR CELL PHONE LOCATION 
DATA 
A. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
A number of federal circuits have found that cell phone location data 
does not garner Fourth Amendment protection. Both the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits, in their assessment of the collection of historical location data, 
relied on a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine and 
suspects making a voluntary disclosure.51 The Fifth Circuit, for example, 
analogizing to Smith v. Maryland, reasoned, “A cell service subscriber, like 
a telephone user, understands that his cell phone must send a signal to a 
nearby cell tower in order to wirelessly connect his call.”52 
The Third Circuit, in reaching a similar conclusion, focused instead on 
the public disclosure doctrine.53 Citing Knotts, the court explained: 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that [historical cell phone location data] may, 
under certain circumstances, be used to approximate the past location of a 
person . . . . [Prior opinions] make clear that the privacy interests at issue are 
confined to the interior of the home. There is no evidence in this record that 
historical [cell phone location data] . . . extends to that realm. We therefore 
cannot accept the . . . conclusion that [this data] . . . requires probable cause 
for its production.54  
The Third Circuit’s point here seems to be that historical cell phone 
 
48 Id. at 950–54 (majority opinion); id. at 955–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 961–64 (Alito, 
J., concurring). The theory put forth by the concurrences has been dubbed the “mosaic theory.” See 
Bedi, supra note 22, at 1834–38. 
49 For a discussion on the physical trespass doctrine and the mosaic theory, see generally Andrew 
Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1283 (2014) [http://perma.cc/G9L2-D7UJ]; Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. 
Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 17–32 (2012) [http://perma.cc/CG4X-S2VP]. 
50 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 954 (majority opinion) (“It may be that achieving [four-week surveillance] 
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, 
but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”). In fact, drawing a defensible line as 
to when surveillance becomes too long to fall under the public disclosure doctrine seems untenable. See 
Bedi, supra note 22, at 1839–48 (discussing various problems with the mosaic theory). 
51 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir 2015) [http://perma.cc/L4BY-8JR7]; In re 
Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013). 
52 In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613; see also Davis, 785 F.3d 
at 512. 
53 In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose 
Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010). 
54 Id. at 312–13. 
110:61 (2015) The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data 
69 
location data is no different from the location data documented by other 
tracking device technology that simply catalogs public locations. 
Interestingly, however, and in contrast with the Fifth Circuit, the Third 
Circuit went on to explain that the third-party doctrine would not 
necessarily support the same conclusion since a cell phone user does not 
voluntary share location data with her cell phone provider.55 
Real-time location data would appear to fall or stand with historical 
location data. This information is also initially disclosed to a cell phone 
provider, albeit quickly transmitted to the government thereafter. For this 
reason, some courts have treated historical and real-time data the same 
way, finding no protection based on an application of the third-party 
doctrine.56 
The Sixth Circuit has gone one step further by finding that pinging a 
cell phone user’s phone to ascertain her real-time location also does not 
trigger Fourth Amendment protection.57 In reaching its conclusion, the 
court distinguished between the effects of the public disclosure doctrine 
and the third-party doctrine in this context.58 The court analogized to Knotts 
and reasoned that the police could have acquired “that same 
information . . . through visual surveillance.”59 At the same time, the court 
also seemed to recognize that the third-party doctrine may suggest a 
different outcome.60 It was the government’s act of pinging the cell phone 
that triggered the location, not a voluntary act by the cell phone user.61 
However, because the real-time data was simply a proxy for a suspect’s 
public location, there was no Fourth Amendment protection.62 
B. Finding Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Other courts have found that this data should, at least in some 
circumstances, garner Fourth Amendment protection. These decisions often 
emphasize the voluntariness element (or lack of it) in the application of the 
third-party doctrine. The most recent decision on the issue comes from the 
Fourth Circuit, which found that, unlike the telephone user in Smith v. 
Maryland who knowingly conveyed the number dialed, the cell phone 
 
55 Id. at 317. 
56 See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 145–47 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013); United States v. Booker, No. 1:11-CR-255-1-TWT, 2013 WL 2903562, at *9 (N.D. 
Ga. June 13, 2013). 
57 The Sixth Circuit has ruled in two cases on this matter. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 
(6th Cir 2012) [http://perma.cc/QR7B-TF2X]; United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004) 
[http://perma.cc/GZ4Z-5UBA], cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1100 
(2005). 
58 Forest, 355 F.3d at 951–52. 
59 Skinner, 690 F.3 at 778. Similar to Knotts, the court found that it was not crucial that the 
government may not have had visual contact throughout the full-length surveillance. The key fact was 
that the movements could be observed by visual observation. Id. at 779. 
60 Forest, 355 F.3d at 951. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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provider did not voluntarily share her location in any meaningful way.63 
The court reasoned, “A cell phone user cannot be said to ‘voluntarily 
convey’ to her service provider information that she never held but was 
instead generated by the service provider itself without the user’s 
involvement.”64 The court also found that the fact the company’s privacy 
policies mentioned this collection did not suggest a different conclusion 
since most users are not familiar with or otherwise understand their 
provider’s policies.65 
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion on the issue of 
voluntariness.66 But what makes its decision so interesting is that the court 
simultaneously acknowledged that the public disclosure doctrine would 
suggest that this same data is not protected.67 This tension between the two 
disclosure doctrines underscores the different foundational triggers 
underlying each. More on this later. 
Some courts have also used the voluntariness element to distinguish 
Smith v. Maryland from real-time location data.68 As one district court 
explained, “Unlike dialed telephone numbers, cell site data is not 
‘voluntarily conveyed’ by the user to the phone company. [Rather,] it is 
transmitted automatically during the registration process, entirely 
independent of the user’s input, control, or knowledge.”69 
It is interesting how these cases appear to discount the public 
disclosure doctrine. To the extent it applies, the doctrine does not depend 
on whether a court classifies the transmission of the location data as 
voluntary or not. Nor does it matter how the government acquired the data. 
All that matters is that the movements are vulnerable to visual observation. 
The Fourth Circuit discussed the public disclosure doctrine but 
concluded it did not ultimately apply to the facts at hand. The court seemed 
to make a two-fold argument. First, it denied the basic premise that 
historical location data reveals otherwise public information. “[U]nlike 
GPS monitoring of a vehicle, examination of historical [cell phone data] 
can permit the government to track a person’s movements between public 
and private spaces, impacting at once her interests in both the privacy of 
her movements and the privacy of her home.”70 The court cited to the risk 
of cell phone tower location data revealing private information such as 
 
63 United States v. Graham, No 12-4659, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *46 (4th Cir. August 5, 
2015). 
64 Id. at *52. 
65 Id. at *20–21 and n.3. 
66 In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose 
Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010). 
67 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
68 In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 
396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756–57 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [http://perma.cc/9ZBU-ELAP]. 
69 Id. 
70 Graham, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13653, at *30. 
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outpatient medical treatment or regular church visits.71 
It is not clear whether this line of reasoning is ultimately persuasive. 
The same objection can also apply to public car movements such as those 
in Knotts. Police can surveil a suspect’s car entering a church parking lot or 
medical complex. These acts would also seemingly reveal personal 
information but none are currently protected because of the public 
disclosure doctrine. Both cell phone tower data and a car’s movements 
through streets are public information and thus stand or fall together.72 
The Fourth Circuit also relied on the Jones concurrences in finding 
that the sheer amount of data revealed (in this case, it was movements over 
220 days) militated against a straightforward application of the public 
disclosure doctrine.73 These discussions on the privacy implications of 
long-term surveillance—while interesting and worthy of consideration—
are ultimately beyond the scope of this Essay, because current precedent 
dictates that all public monitoring—regardless of length—carries no Fourth 
Amendment protection.74 
 
IV. PICKING AND CHOOSING BETWEEN THE DOCTRINES: A ROAD TO 
HARMONY 
As the previous Part illustrates, courts seem to be all over the map 
when it comes to analyzing cell phone location data under the Fourth 
Amendment and whether this data merits protection. This disagreement 
largely centers on which doctrine a court uses and how it uses that doctrine. 
Take, for example, the application of the third-party doctrine. A major 
point of contention is whether a cell phone user actually voluntarily 
discloses her location when making or receiving calls. This seems like a 
legitimate issue on which reasonable people can disagree. Because a user’s 
location—unlike a dialed number—is automatically transmitted after the 
phone turns on, this action may not qualify as a voluntary disclosure. 
Scholars too disagree on this point.75 Perhaps the question of voluntariness 
 
71 Id. at *28 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
[http://perma.cc/M98L-QT53]). 
72 A different constitutional conclusion under the public disclosure doctrine could result if the 
location data revealed the cell phone location rather than the public tower location. See supra note 40. 
However, only cell phone tower locations were at issue in United States v. Graham. 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 13653, at *14, *15–17. 
73 Id. at *33–38; see also In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of 
Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (considering the public 
disclosure doctrine when tracking occurs for 113 days) [http://perma.cc/F396-RL9J]. But see United 
States v. Wilson, No. 1:11-CR-53-TCB-ECS-3, 2013 WL 1129199, at *5–7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2013) 
(finding no Fourth Amendment violations in a request limited to cell phone tower data over a twenty-
one day period). 
74 See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text. 
75 Compare Freiwald, supra note 15, at 733–34 (finding voluntariness lacking), with Orin Kerr, 
Fourth Amendment Stunner: Judge Rules that Cell-Site Data Protected by Fourth Amendment Warrant 
Requirement, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 31, 2010, 2:46 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/31/fourth-
amendment-stunner-judge-rules-that-cell-site-data-protected-by-fourth-amendment-warrant-
requirement (finding sufficient voluntariness) [http://perma.cc/X23K-PCJA]. See also Monu Bedi, 
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should influence how we analyze the doctrine in this context, particularly 
given how prevalent cell phone use has become. 
The more troubling area of disagreement, however, and the focus of 
this Essay, is how we should pick between the third-party and public 
disclosure doctrines. The analysis is not as cut and dry, as evidenced by the 
different way courts have handled this choice. And the decision seems 
rather consequential when one considers that the public disclosure doctrine 
suggests none of this data is protected. To see the problem, one needs only 
to look at the Third Circuit and its explicit recognition that the two 
doctrines lead to different conclusions on the privacy question of historical 
location data.76 Things get even more complicated when considering the 
other kinds of cell phone location data—real-time location data and pinged 
data—and the different ways courts have handled them. Are we simply left 
with ad hoc judgments on which doctrine to use in what context, or is there 
some principled way for courts to make this choice?77 
The problem centers on the unique nature of cell phone location data. 
On the one hand, the government can treat it like the collection of 
nonpublic information, no different than dialed telephone numbers (think 
historical location data). On the other hand, this data can also be seen as 
publicly available data that facilitates surveillance, no different than GPS 
monitoring (think real-time location data). 
Historically, the collection of nonpublic information and surveillance 
of public movements were neatly separated. Collection of bank records, 
telephone numbers, and incriminating statements are all information-
gathering activities of nonpublic data that have nothing to do with 
surveillance of the suspect’s physical location. On the other hand, use of 
beeper technology and GPS are surveillance methods of a suspect’s public 
movements that do nothing more than relay her physical location.78 
Police use of cell phone location data has blurred the line between 
these two types of activities. The first step to harmonizing the doctrines, 
then, is ascertaining in which context the government activity occurs with 
the recognition that the application of two doctrines is not mutually 
exclusive. I take the three scenarios in turn. 
 
Texting the Government Your Location: The Case of Historical Cell Phone Location Data and Fourth 
Amendment Protection, CASETEXT (Aug. 26, 2015), https://casetext.com/posts/texting-the-government-
your-location (discussing the issue of whether users voluntarily disclose their location data) 
[http://perma.cc/Q6UR-JPNR]. 
76 See supra notes 53–55, 66 and accompanying text.  
77 Scholarship on the subject is not much help here as those discussions are more general in nature. 
See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 15, at 733; Recent Case, State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013), 
127 HARV. L. REV. 2164 (2014) [http://perma.cc/S9P8-UB6C]. 
78 I recognize that location data (whether by GPS, beeper, or cell phone use) is also a type of 
information, and so even in the second scenario, the government is technically “collecting information.” 
But the key difference here is that this information (unlike telephone data) is susceptible to visual 
observation and facilitates surveillance of the suspect. 
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A. Historical Location Data 
The government seeking historical location data from the cell provider 
stands on the same footing as the government acquiring a history of 
telephone numbers from the telephone company over a period of time. 
Both scenarios only potentially trigger an application of the third-party 
doctrine. The government is collecting nonpublic information from a third 
party. Whether the doctrine actually applies of course still depends on 
whether the disclosure of data to the provider is considered a voluntary one. 
One may take issue with my conclusion that the public disclosure 
doctrine is inapplicable here. Were these movements not public at one time, 
thus triggering this doctrine? To be sure, the Third and Fourth Circuits 
discussed this doctrine at length in the context of historical location data, 
albeit reaching different conclusions as to its applicability.79 But the 
problem here is we’re talking about public data in the past tense. These 
were public movements and at that time the government could have 
surveilled the person’s location using this data without first seeking a 
warrant. But these data points—at the point the government is now seeking 
them from the provider—are no longer public (i.e., susceptible to visual 
surveillance) and, as such, the risk of the government observing them has 
now passed along with application of the public disclosure doctrine. In fact, 
it seems odd to say that the government, in collecting historical data, is 
nonetheless surveilling the suspect’s public movements when those 
movements are no longer taking place. This is not to say that the police 
cannot gather this historical data to conduct prospective surveillance of the 
suspect, but the suspect’s potential future public movements are 
conceptually different from prior public movements and the collection of 
her historical location data. The latter are now no different than any other 
nonpublic information—whether it is telephone numbers, bank statements, 
etc.—the government acquires from a third party.80 
In some ways, this is a better outcome for those who think historical 
location data deserves constitutional protection. If the public disclosure 
doctrine does not reach this data, there is no need to argue against its 
application. This conclusion renders moot much of the aforementioned 
Fourth Circuit discussion on the more private nature of cell phone versus 
automobile location data, as well as the concern over large amounts of 
surveillance records. 
 
79 See supra notes 53–54, 70–73 and accompany text. 
80 A potential—though ultimately unpersuasive—counterargument would be that under the public 
disclosure doctrine, once something has been made public, it is public for good. This line of reasoning 
would conclude that historical location data—because it was at one point public—is forever considered 
public information. This is a strained reading of the doctrine as the Court has applied it. These cases and 
their operative facts (see supra Part II.B) clearly contemplate contemporaneous visual observation. To 
hold otherwise would make meaningless the surveillance activity being conducted by the police in all 
these cases. Moreover, this line of reasoning would also mean that once information is made public, 
albeit even briefly, it could never garner Fourth Amendment protection. This seems like a drastic 
conclusion that would have severe, unwanted implications for privacy protection. 
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That said, the privacy implications of the latter could also work as a 
limiting principle for the third-party doctrine. While the operative facts of 
Jones dealt with contemporaneous surveillance, a historical map of an 
individual’s movements over a lengthy period of time may also trigger 
privacy concerns for the same reason (e.g., revelation of a person’s political 
affiliation or medical treatment).81 Whether the effects of long-term 
historical data collection should be part of the third-party doctrine analysis 
is, again, beyond the scope of this Essay. 
B. Real-Time Location Data 
Categorizing real-time location data is a bit trickier. This kind of data 
can potentially be analyzed under both doctrines. In one sense, the 
government is acquiring information from the cell phone provider, very 
similar to historical data or telephone numbers. Whether the third-party 
doctrine is triggered, however, depends in large part on how one 
conceptualizes the risk of exposure. Certainly, as previously explained, the 
main thrust of the doctrine contemplates nonpublic information. Still, one 
could argue that this doctrine does not require only one risk. In other 
words, an individual could be taking on both the risk that the user’s 
location may be disclosed by the particular third party as well as the risk 
that it is currently susceptible to public view.82 
This is an interesting discussion but ultimately turns out to be 
irrelevant when assessing Fourth Amendment protection. Whichever way 
one answers the question of the potential reach of the third-party doctrine 
to real-time location data, there is no privacy protection because the public 
disclosure doctrine obviously applies. The government is using public 
location data—i.e., movements susceptible to visual surveillance—to 
contemporaneously track a suspect.83 This is no different than the 
government using a beeper or GPS device to surveil an individual. 
While the applicability of the public disclosure doctrine is 
straightforward, the operative facts for the third-party doctrine may not be 
present. This is not problematic. These doctrines were never designed to 
both be necessary conditions for vitiating privacy protection. Take the 
Knotts case. There, a fortiori, the third-party doctrine does not apply 
because the suspect—lacking knowledge of the beeper—could not possibly 
have voluntarily conveyed his location to the government. This fact was 
not relevant to the lack of privacy protection because the suspect’s public 
movements fell directly under the public disclosure doctrine. 
The difference in Fourth Amendment protection between real-time 
data (automatically not protected under public disclosure doctrine) and 
historical data (may not be protected under the third-party doctrine) makes 
 
81 See supra notes 45–50, 73 and accompanying text. 
82 Of course, there remains the question of whether the disclosure to the cell phone provider is 
voluntary. 
83 I assume here that the location data only reveals public locations such as the cell tower location. 
110:61 (2015) The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data 
75 
sense when assessing the relative privacy concerns in each scenario. With 
stored data, the police can have easy access to significant amounts of 
location history. There is no practical limitation to the timeframe they may 
acquire. This concern may militate in favor of having a robust requirement 
of voluntariness under the third-party doctrine so it is harder to acquire this 
information without Fourth Amendment protection. On the other hand, use 
of real-time data has some built-in practical limitations. It requires at least 
some sort contemporaneous police surveillance (even if alleviated by the 
relevant technology), which naturally limits how much data is collected. 
Here then, a straightforward application of the public disclosure doctrine 
may not be as detrimental to privacy concerns. 
C. Location Data from “Pinging” 
Analysis of the third scenario involving pinging a cell phone would 
work in a similar way to real-time data. Here, the third-party doctrine is 
clearly not applicable because there has been no disclosure by the cell 
phone user. It is the cell phone company—in concert with the 
government—that is actively sending signals to the cell phone. Once again, 
though, the public disclosure doctrine squarely applies as the government is 
tracking the public movements of the cell phone user via the provider’s cell 
towers.84 Those who feel that real-time location data should garner Fourth 
Amendment protection must argue for the Court to adopt some limiting 




The lessons here go beyond cell phone location data. If there is 
anything to be certain of, it is that technology will continue to advance. 
This inevitably will lead police to having better information-gathering 
capacity and surveillance ability. Unless the Court acts, the third-party and 
public disclosure doctrines will continue to stand as two central hurdles to 
Fourth Amendment protection in these situations. It is important we 
 
84 This conclusion, again, assumes that the government is only receiving the cell phone tower 
location and not the actual location of the cell phone. Acquiring the latter through pinging the phone 
may sweep in nonpublic information and thus change the analysis. See supra note 40. A similar 
conclusion would potentially apply to “stingray” devices, assuming that they also only reveal public 
locations. These devices mimic cell phone towers and have the ability to gather location data without 
permission of the cell phone provider and before it reaches the cell tower. See, e.g., Brian L. Owsley, 
Spies in the Skies: Dirtboxes and Airplane Electronic Surveillance, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 75, 76 (2015) [http://perma.cc/S6WH-ZF8V]. While scholars and courts seem to find that 
these devices constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, In re Application of U.S. for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 
752 (S.D. Tex. 2012) [http://perma.cc/83FC-ZQC9]; Owsley, supra; and Stephanie K. Pell & 
Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government 
Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 
28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 32 (2015) [http://perma.cc/KAQ7-QCGE], a straightforward application of 
the public disclosure doctrine would suggest otherwise as these movements would be susceptible to 
visual observation. 
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understand the historical context and unique contours of each doctrine. 
Only then can we intelligently discuss whether and how they should, or 
should not, apply to future technologies. 
 
